This analysis joins the debate on how declines in marriage have shifted the composition of the unmarried and married populations in the United States, and how compositional shifts have affected nonmarital birth rates. Gray, Stockard, and Stone (2006) presented one model for compositional effects that Ermisch (2009) challenged with alternative statistical tests. I propose an alternative model for compositional shifts based not on theory but on observed marriage and fertility patterns. The results from this alternative model are consistent with Ermisch's fi ndings yet support Gray et al.'s general case that compositional effects have had an important infl uence on nonmarital birth rates.
eclines in the proportion married among U.S. women of childbearing age have changed the composition of the married and unmarried populations, and this compositional shift has affected nonmarital and marital birth rates. Gray, Stockard, and Stone (2006, here after GSS) presented a model in which compositional effects explain all the changes in the nonmarital birth ratio from 1974 to 2000. Ermisch (2009) , using alternative statistical tests on the same data, concluded that much of change in the ratio of nonmarital to marital birth rates is not explained by declines in marriage.
In this comment, I compare Ermisch's and GSS's main results, and largely confi rm Ermisch's fi ndings. However, I argue that GSS are at least partly correct in that there is some kind of compositional effect on nonmarital and marital birth rates, even if other processes act directly on those birth rates. However, the GSS model uses incorrect assumptions about the relationship between marriage and an underlying fertility distribution. I use empirical distributions of marriage and fertility to propose a modifi ed interpretation of compositional effects on nonmarital fertility.
REVISITING THE MAIN RESULTS
The compositional model proposed by GSS predicts that the following equation will hold true as marriage declines over time:
(1)
In Eq. (1), NFR is the nonmarital fertility ratio, and Su is the proportion of the population unmarried. GSS found that trends in NFR match trends in Su 2 remarkably well across time periods and age groups, consistent with the predictions of their compositional model.
Ermisch employed an alternative equation to test the GSS model, In Table 1 , the results for NFR and Su 2 are very close to the predicted. For non-Hispanic white women, NFR increased from 0.039 in 1974 to 0.206 in 2000, while Su 2 increased from 0.077 to 0.250. The ratio of the trends is 0.964. If I break the 26-year trend into halves, the ratio is still a respectable 0.799 for 1974-1987 and 1.215 for 1987-2000. For non-Hispanic black women, NFR and Su 2 also rise together, with an overall ratio of trends of 0.805, and some variation when the time period is divided into halves.
The same data expressed as UBR / MBR and Su / (1 + Su) deviate much more from the predicted ratios. For non-Hispanic white women, UBR / MBR increased from 0.121 to 0.315, while Su / (1 + Su) increased from 0.200 to 0.310. The overall ratio of trends of 1.757 differs markedly from the predicted 1.000. The ratio of trends for 1987 to 2000 is even further off at 2.747. For non-Hispanic black women, the overall ratio of trends is 0.971. However, the ratios for 1974-1987 (2.162) and for 1987-2000 (-1.348) are far from the predicted ratio of 1.000. From Table 1 , I conclude that the statistically signifi cant lack of fi t and the specifi c deviations reported by Ermisch refl ect a substantively important deviation from the patterns predicted by the GSS compositional model across the entire span of the study.
The results in Table 1 appear at fi rst to be incompatible not only with the GSS compositional model but also with any sort of compositional interpretation. In the late 1980s and 1990s, Su / (1 + Su) increased for both whites and blacks, but UBR / MBR rose rapidly for whites while it fell for blacks; so it is not immediately clear how the same compositional effect could produce opposite patterns. However, blacks and whites show comparable fertility trends at comparable proportions unmarried, even though they reach those proportions at different times. When Su is increasing but small (so that Su / (1 + Su) is about .25), increases in the ratio of nonmarital to marital birth rates are steeper than predicted by the GSS model. Non-Hispanic black women reached this stage of marriage decline in the 1970s, and non-Hispanic white women reached the same after 1987. As Su continues to increase to a majority of the overall population, the ratio of nonmarital to marital birth rates decreases and may actually reverse itself. Non-Hispanic black women reached this level of marriage decline after 1987, and non-Hispanic white women did not reach this level in the time period of the analysis. While this evidence is admittedly scant, I argue in the following section that patterns in the decline in marriage across the population are consistent with a compositional effect just like this one.
ASSUMPTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS OF THE MARRIAGE DISTRIBUTION
In their model, GSS assumed that the decline in marriage is moving systematically from the bottom to the top of a fi xed distribution of fertility probabilities. As the proportion unmarried increases, the "cutoff" point between singlehood and marriage slides up the fertility distribution, and nonmarital and marital birth rates increase in a predictable ratio. Table 2 shows this assumed marriage distribution, conditional on the distribution of fertility probabilities. Note that the proportion unmarried reaches 100% at a lower fertility probability before it exceeds 0% at the next higher fertility probability.
The fertility probabilities assumed by the GSS models would be very diffi cult to measure directly. However, the distribution of time spent in marriage conditional on fertility outcomes can be observed for women who have fi nished their childbearing. From such a distribution, one cannot prove that the fertility distribution is fi xed as the marriage distribution changes, but one can judge whether the proportions married across fertility levels are at least consistent with the assumptions of the model.
The fi rst rows of Table 3 show marriage distributions conditional on the fertility distribution for ages 20-39. Data come from the June 1995 Current Population Survey, Marriage and Fertility Supplement (U.S. Census Bureau 2002) . The cohorts (women aged 40-44 in the late 1970s and women aged 40-44 in the early 1990s) correspond roughly to the beginning and middle of the period studied by GSS.
The early cohort in Table 3 shows a gradient of marriage and fertility in the direction predicted by GSS, although the correspondence is not perfect. Among non-Hispanic white women in the earlier cohort, women with no births at age 20-39 spent 49.9% of ages 20-39 unmarried, while women with four births at age 20-39 spent only 12.1% of those years unmarried. For non-Hispanic black women, the percentage unmarried was higher, but the gradient was similar.
The main discrepancy between Table 3 and the assumptions of the GSS model is in trends across cohorts. Declines in marriage are not proceeding from the lowest fertility category to the next lowest fertility category, as assumed by the GSS model. Instead, all fertility categories show an increase in time unmarried.
To this point, Tables 1 and 3 exclude 15-to 19-year-olds because GSS excluded women aged 15 to 19 from their model. GSS removed teenagers from their analysis because teen births "do not typically arise from a deliberate assessment of desired family size" (GSS 2006:250) and because the results for teens deviate strongly from the predictions of the GSS model. However, it is unclear how to interpret trends in nonmarital births without teenagers because in the mid-1970s, most nonmarital births were to teenagers (Ventura and Bachrach 2000) . Furthermore, nonmarital births at all ages are often unintended, so GSS would need to explain why they retained unintended nonmarital births at older ages. I contend that unintended fertility is not confounding a compositional effect; unintended fertility is a compositional effect, but of a different form than assumed by GSS.
The lower rows of Table 3 show the distribution of marriages and births from age 15 to 39, not just 20 to 39. In these results, the largest increases in percentage unmarried are in the highest fertility category for blacks and whites. The very largest is an increase of 22.8% for non-Hispanic black women with four or more children.
The results in Table 3 suggest a signifi cant revision of the GSS model. In early cohorts, most single women are at the lowest levels of the fertility distribution, as assumed by GSS. However, subsequent delays in marriage increase the time spent single not at the next lowest levels of fertility, as assumed by GSS, but among all types of women, and particularly among women who have higher overall levels of fertility than the general population-perhaps women with fewer incentives or resources for postponing fertility. This part of the revised compositional model predicts rapid increases in nonmarital fertility at early stages of the decline in marriage, consistent with results in Table 1 . Then, later stages of marriage decline will be concentrated in the remaining middle of the fertility distribution, so additional compositional changes might actually reduce the ratio of nonmarital to marital birth rates, as was observed for black women from 1987 to 2000. As of 2000, white women had not reached a high enough level of Su to predict a leveling off or decline in UBR / MBR, but the revised compositional model predicts such a pattern in the future for whites. This revised compositional model is consistent with a standard interpretation of marriage decline. Many women, especially those of higher social strata, are postponing both marriage and childbearing. Women of lower social strata (and often higher fertility) also postpone marriage and sometimes forgo marriage altogether, and are having more births outside of marriage (McLanahan 2004) .
DISCUSSION
I have made a case for a different compositional model than the one proposed by GSS. However, one might contend that any compositional model is unnecessary when other explanations for rising nonmarital and marital fertility are widely accepted and do a good job of explaining fertility trends. As examples, Ermisch cited rising cohabitation and the increasing social acceptability of single motherhood. The sharp decline in premaritally pregnant women marrying before the birth of a child from the 1970s to the 1990s (Bachu 1999) supports such alternative explanations for rising nonmarital fertility and even suggests that the changing circumstances of nonmarital fertility have affected marriage rates, not the other way around. Ermisch recommended that analyses of changing birth rates should control for these variables before assigning any residual effects to population composition.
A possible problem with Ermisch's recommendation is that the control variables themselves might harbor compositional effects. For example, the acceptability of nonmarital childbearing has increased across all social strata, but it has increased more among groups of women who often have higher and earlier fertility than the rest of the population. An analysis of trends in nonmarital fertility would need covariates to measure the supposed compositional effects as well as covariates for the direct effects. Such variables might include expected number of children and expected age at fi rst birth. All these variables would have to be measured before childbearing, with marriage and fertility histories gathered across later panels for the same respondents, for separate cohorts of women. It would be very diffi cult to do such a study with existing data.
The changing composition of the unmarried population is likely part of the process affecting nonmarital and marital birth rates, even if the complex causal relationships resist a defi nitive statistical analysis. The decline of marriage has moved into unmarried status a population of women very different from the women who were single a generation ago, and has extended the time unmarried for most women. Along with other factors, this changing composition of the single population has changed the aggregate behavior of single women, the cultural expectations of single women, and women's decisions to cohabit or marry.
